


























CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1099 











An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 











This paper develops a model in which workers to a certain extent enjoy working. We examine 
the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We 
show that motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e.ort, are willing to work 
for a lower wage. When people di.er in their motivation to work at a particular firm, the 
profits of the firm depend on its capability to attract and select highly motivated workers. We 
show that when the firm has all the bargaining power and workers face application cost, the 
firm needs to commit to a minimum wage o.er in order to attract workers. A higher minimum 
wage increases the probability to fill the vacancy, but decreases the expected average quality 
of job applicants, as it induces lower motivated workers to apply. The optimal level of the 
minimum wage depends on whether or not the firm can observe the motivation of the 
applicants. If applicants can credibly signal their motivation, a minimum wage not only helps 
to attract workers, but also to select the best-motivated worker among the job applicants. 
JEL Classification: D82, J31, J42, M51, M52. 
Keywords: signaling and screening models, intrinsic motivation, monetary incentive schemes, 











Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Department of Economics 
H 7-21, P.O. Box 1738 






We thank Bruno Frey, Otto Swank, Harry Verbon, and participants of the 2002 Annual 
Meeting of the European Public Choice Society for useful comments. We gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from NWO, KNAW and VSNU through a 
Vernieuwingsimpuls grant. 
 1 Introduction
Economic models of worker behaviour typically assume that people dislike
working. Hence, in order to induce workers to exert eﬀort, employers must
provide external incentives. Employers have diﬀerent means to increase
workers’ eﬀort. For instance, the introduction of pay-for-performance de-
vices will induce employees to work harder. Equivalently, closer monitoring
of workers’ eﬀort, accompanied by sanctions (e.g. dismissal) in case of shirk-
ing, will also result in higher eﬀort.
Empirical research suggests that the standard neoclassical view of worker
behaviour is often too narrow. Agell and Lundborg (1999) report results
of a survey among managers in Swedish manufacturing and conclude that
”much recent theorizing about eﬀort and incentives is potentially misplaced
[because] most managers appear to ascribe a more important motivational
role to psychological and sociological factors than to economic sticks and
carrots” (p. 25). Interviews with US managers by Bewley (1998) yield cor-
responding results. Rather than monetary incentives, managers emphasize
that work should be interesting and stimulating, that workers should feel in-
volved in decision-making, and that workers’ achievements are noticed and
appreciated. One Swedish manager responded that ”people work hard as
long as they have fun”.
Surveys among employees also indicate that monetary rewards are of
much less importance for job satisfaction and workers’ eﬀort than postulated
in economic analysis. For instance, in a 1977 survey of the US labour force,
half of the respondents agreed with the statement that ”what I do at work
is more important to me than the money I earn”, and more than 90 percent
stated that they put in more eﬀo r ti n t ot h e i rj o bt h a nr e q u i r e d( Q u i n na n d
Staines, 1979). Even though we should be cautious (or even suspicious)
about stated preferences, the results of these surveys suggest that a large
part of the labour force is motivated at work by more than just monetary
rewards (Baron, 1988).
The observation that workers may provide eﬀort for non-pecuniary rea-
sons has two important implications. First, monetary incentive schemes
designed to motivate a ’standard neoclassical worker’ may be suboptimal.
Second, when people diﬀer in their motivation, the performance of a ﬁrm
may become dependent on its capability to select the ’best motivated’ can-
didate among job applicants.
This paper relaxes the standard assumption in the economic literature
that people dislike working to study these issues. We develop a model in
which workers to a certain extent like to exert eﬀort at the workplace. Hence,
people like their job, not only because they get paid, but also because they
enjoy working. Whereas this type of motivation is virtually absent in main-
stream economics, scholars outside economics often have a much broader
view on people’s motivations. Psychologists, in particular, have argued that
2people undertake many activities without expecting an extrinsic reward.
’Intrinsic motivation’ is considered to be of major importance for human
behaviour (see e.g. DeCharms, 1968, Deci, 1971, and Furnham, 1990).
People may be intrinsically motivated to work for diﬀerent reasons. One
might simply like to undertake certain activities. The activities which are
intrinsically valued, and hence the evaluation of intrinsic qualities of diﬀerent
jobs, may vary across people. A motivated veterinary surgeon is not likely
to be motivated to work as a butcher. Intrinsic motivation is not related to
persons, but to combinations of certain people and certain jobs.1
Intrinsic motivation may also be related to ’self-esteem’, broadly deﬁned
as how people think about themselves. Thus, people may be intrinsically
motivated to work (or to refrain from shirking), because it makes them think
better about themselves. Self-esteem may be enhanced by working or re-
fraining from shirking in general, but it may also be related to particular kind
of jobs. For instance, workers in hospitals may feel that they contribute to a
goal which is considered to be ’good’. Dixit (2002) notes that organisations
that serve an idealistic or ethical purpose may be particularly attractive for
people who share these goals. Obviously, which goals are considered to be
’good’ may diﬀer among individuals.
Regardless of the precise reason for the enjoyment of or satisfaction from
work, the baseline is that people can derive utility from working. The pres-
ence of intrinsically motivated workers has important implications for ﬁrms.
Motivated people probably work harder, which increases output. And be-
cause people derive utility from the job, they may be willing to work for a
lower wage. People will take job satisfaction into account when deciding on
whether to accept or reject a wage oﬀer. A higher wage at another job may
not compensate for the loss of intrinsic qualities of the job.2
We develop a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic
motivation to work at a particular ﬁrm. Working at the ﬁrm has some
unique trait which is valued diﬀerently by diﬀerent workers, giving the ﬁrm
monopsony power. We study two issues. First, we examine the implications
of workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We
extend a standard incentive wage model and show that – in line with Dixit
(2002) – motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of eﬀort, are
1The kind of intrinsic motivation that we focus on in this paper diﬀers from an intrinsic
motivation to behave reciprocally, as studied by Akerlof (1982) and Falk et al. (1999),
or intrinsic feelings of altruism towards one’s colleagues or boss, which is studied by
Rotemberg (1994). These concepts of intrinsic motivation are less related to a speciﬁc
job than the one we focus on. Workers in our model have an action-oriented motivation:
They ﬁnd exerting eﬀort enjoyable. Francois (2000) and Glazer (2002) study incentive
pay when workers value the ﬁrm’s output.
2The idea that workers accept a lower wage in return for a job with intrinsic qualities
can be found in e.g. Hansmann (1980), Preston (1989), Frank (1996), and Rose-Ackerman
(1996). Recent empirical evidence is provided by Leete (2001), Frey, Kucher, and Stutzer
(2001), and Frey and Kucher (2002).
3willing to work for a lower wage. The higher the ﬁrm’s bargaining power,
the more it can extract the motivational rents from the worker. When the
ﬁrm has suﬃcient bargaining power, a better motivated worker brings about
higher output and, under a mild condition, lower wage cost. We also show
that when the ﬁrm has a decreasing returns to eﬀort production technology,
monetary incentives are weaker, the more motivated its workers.3
Second, we examine how the ﬁrm can attract and select highly moti-
vated workers to ﬁll a vacancy. We assume that each worker has positive
probability to observe the vacancy. The workers who observe the vacancy
decide whether or not to apply, taking application cost into account. When
each applicant’s motivation is observable to the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm has all
the bargaining power, none of the workers applies for the vacancy. Each
worker anticipates that the ﬁrm extracts all rents of motivation, leaving the
worker with the sunk application cost. This result is known as the Diamond
paradox (Diamond, 1971; see also Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). When
the ﬁrm can not observe the motivation of the workers, none of the workers
applies either. The intuition is simple. Consider the incentive to apply for
the job for the least motivated worker among all potential applicants. The
ﬁrm will never oﬀer a wage that compensates this worker for his applica-
tion cost. Hence, the least motivated worker optimally decides not to apply.
Knowing this, a slightly higher motivated worker applies neither, and so
on and so forth. As in Akerlof’s lemon market, the market collapses. In
Akerlof’s model, the existence of bad types drives the good types out of the
market (Akerlof, 1970). Interestingly, in our model, it is the withdrawal of
the bad types from the market that drives out the good types.
We argue that, both with observable and with unobservable motivation,
the ﬁrm can attract applicants by making a credible commitment to pay at
least a certain wage. This minimum wage ensures that (some of the) work-
ers obtain part of the rents of their motivation, which compensates for the
application cost, thereby resolving the Diamond paradox. When motivation
of applicants is observable to the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm hires the worker with the
highest motivation among those who applied. The proﬁt-maximising level
of the minimum wage is determined by the trade-oﬀ between wage cost and
the probability of ﬁlling the vacancy. When motivation is unobservable,
there is an additional selection eﬀect. A higher minimum wage decreases
the expected average quality of job applicants, as it induces lower motivated
workers to apply. Hence, the probability that a high motivated worker is se-
lected decreases. However, if applicants can credibly signal their motivation
to the ﬁrm, a commitment to a minimum wage gives them an incentive to
3I no u rm o d e l ,i ti sa l w a y si nt h eﬁrm’s interest to provide monetary incentives even
when workers are highly motivated. This is not the case when external incentives crowd
out intrinsic motivation. Frey (1997) discusses various reasons why external incentives
may be harmful to a worker’s intrinsic motivation. See also Kreps (1997). Benabou and
Tirole (2003) develop formal models to study crowding out eﬀects of external rewards.
4reveal their motivation, which eliminates the selection eﬀect.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some related liter-
ature. Section 3 examines the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation
for optimal monetary incentive schemes. In Section 4 we study how the ﬁrm
can attract and select highly motivated workers to ﬁll a vacancy, assuming
that the ﬁrm can only oﬀer a ﬁxed wage. Section 5 generalises the results
of Section 4 to the case of optimal monetary incentive schemes, as studied
in Section 3. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis builds on signaling and screening models of the labour market.
A seminal paper in this ﬁeld is Spence (1973), and a recent survey of this
large and still growing literature is Riley (2001). Most studies focus on
screening of workers’ abilities. When the ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases in the ability
of a worker, but it cannot observe workers’ abilities, the ﬁrm wants to induce
workers to signal their ability. Education may be a means to credibly signal
ability to the ﬁrm. Education is costly to the worker, but the higher a
worker’s ability, the lower his cost of education. The ﬁrm can create a
compensation scheme which sorts out the high-ability workers by oﬀering
high wages for people with high education and low wages for people with
low education. As in our model, ﬁrms must commit to pay high wages to
induce workers to signal.
The setup of our model is closely related to the ability-models. The
higher motivated a worker is for a job, the higher output, like in the ability-
models. Hence, ﬁrms prefer to hire the highest motivated applicant. An
important diﬀerence between the ability-models and our model is that mo-
tivation not only aﬀects the worker’s productivity, but also his willingness to
work. A higher motivated worker is willing to exert a given level of eﬀort for
a lower wage. This gives workers an incentive to conceal their motivation.
Janssen (2002) has recently argued that when the demand for high ability
workers is limited, an increase in the supply of high ability workers may
increase their wage. The intuition is that a higher supply reduces a worker’s
chance to get the job. Hence, to induce the workers to incur the cost of
signaling, the ﬁrm must increase its wage oﬀer. Janssen’s model departs
from the standard screening model by assuming that the ﬁrm has monopsony
power. The ﬁrm faces several job applicants, among which it chooses. This
is also an important feature of our model. The standard model considers
t h ec a s eo fo n ew o r k e ra n dt w oﬁrms, see Cho and Kreps (1987).
Most of our analysis focuses on the case where workers’ motivation is un-
observable to the ﬁrm. Hence, our model is a principal-agent model where
the agent (the worker) has private information. Benabou and Tirole (2003),
by contrast, focus on the case where the principal has private information
5about the attractiveness of the job to workers. The choice of the wage scheme
by the principal may then signal his private knowledge to the worker. As
a result, extrinsic rewards may either crowd in or crowd out intrinsic mo-
tivation. Besley and Ghatak (2003) analyse the role of mission choice in a
model where principals and agents are heterogeneous in mission preferences.
An agent is better motivated to work for an organisation of which the mis-
sion is more in line with his preferences. A well-matched combination of
mission and agent type reduces the need for external incentives. As in our
model, the stronger the intrinsic motivation of the agent, the weaker the
external incentives. In contrast to our paper, agents’ intrinsic motivations
are perfectly observable to the principal.
Our work is also related to the job search literature, in particular to
directed search models. A central theme in this part of the literature is
the existence of coordination failures. Multiple ﬁrms open vacancies and
workers decide to which ﬁrms they send an application. More than one
worker may apply for a vacancy, while other vacancies remain unﬁlled (see
e.g. Burdett, Shi, and Wright, 2001). If ﬁrms are heterogeneous, ﬁrms that
face high cost of leaving a vacancy unﬁlled oﬀer higher wages (Montgomery,
1991). As workers send an application with higher probability to ﬁrms that
oﬀer higher wages, ﬁrms increase their probability of ﬁlling the vacancy
by posting a higher wage, as in our model. Another common element is
that workers base their application decision on the probability of getting
the job, which depends on the expected total number of applicants for this
job. Shi (2002) develops a model with high-tech and low-tech ﬁrms and
two types of workers. High-tech ﬁrms set high wages, and attract both high
and low skilled workers. Low-tech ﬁrms pay lower wages, and attract only
low skilled workers. In our model, we have multiple types of workers, but
only one ‘high-tech’ ﬁrm, which therefore has monopsony power over the
‘high-skilled’ workers.
Closest to our paper is Handy and Katz (1998). They study a model in
which potential employees diﬀer in both ability and motivation. While the
ﬁrm can test for an applicant’s ability, it can not distinguish motivated from
unmotivated workers. Handy and Katz show that to promote self-selection
among potential employees, the ﬁrm has an incentive to commit itself to
pay a low wage. By committing to pay a low wage, the ﬁrm is certain that
a job applicant is a motivated worker. Our analysis diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si n
various respects, of which two are crucial. First, we assume that the ﬁrm
can not draw on an inﬁnitely large pool of applicants consisting of all types
of workers. While the ﬁrm would like to hire the worker in the economy
who is most motivated for the job, it can not be certain that this worker
has observed the vacancy and, hence, is in the pool of job applicants. This
implies that a commitment to pay the lowest possible wage (the wage which
is acceptable only to the most motivated worker in the economy) might not
be optimal for the ﬁrm. The reason is that it precludes hiring a worker
6who is somewhat less motivated when the highest motivated worker in the
economy is not available. Hence, the ﬁrm would like to induce workers with
diﬀerent – albeit high – levels of motivation to apply for the job. Second,
we show that Handy and Katz’s result depends on the assumption that
application costs are zero. When application costs are positive, a maximum
wage is of no use whereas a minimum wage helps to attract and select highly
motivated workers.
3 Optimal Monetary Incentive Schemes for Moti-
vated Workers
This section explores the implications ofw o r k e r s ’i n t r i n s i cm o t i v a t i o nf o r
the optimal design of monetary incentive schemes. The literature usually
assumes a worker’s utility function of the form:4
U[w(e),e]
where utility is concave in income (U1 > 0,U 11 < 0), income depends on
eﬀort according to the wage scheme w(e),a n dt h ec o s to fe x e r t i n ge ﬀort is
convex (U2 < 0,U 22 < 0). We introduce intrinsic motivation by adding a
third argument to the utility function:5
U[w(e),e,γie] (1)
where γi ∈ [0,¯ γ]. γi measures the degree to which worker i is intrinsically
motivated, which varies between diﬀerent kind of jobs. The positive utility
derived from eﬀort is assumed to be concave in e (U3 > 0,U 33 < 0).6 Hence,
apart from an indirect eﬀect of eﬀort on income through the wage scheme,
utility ﬁrst increases in eﬀort and then, starting from some level depending
on the value of γi, starts decreasing, see Figure 1. Depending on the level
of e, total utility derived from exerting eﬀort may be positive or negative.
For convenience, we assume that all cross-derivatives are zero: Uij =0for
all i 6= j.
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends on the eﬀort of the worker:
π = q(e) − w(e) (2)
Proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the value of the output generated by the
eﬀort of the worker, q(e), and the wage cost. The production function has
decreasing returns to worker’s eﬀort, q0(e) > 0 and q00(e) < 0.
4See e.g. Rasmussen (1989) and Lazear (1995).
5Without signiﬁcant loss of generality, we introduce intrinsic motivation as a third
argument in the utility function - and not as a modiﬁcation of the second argument - for
ease of exposition.
6Constant, or even increasing, marginal positive utility from eﬀort does not aﬀect the
r e s u l t sa sl o n ga so p t i m a le ﬀort is ﬁnite (i.e., we abstract from ’workaholics’). We also





 γ1 = 0       γ2 > 0     γ3 > γ2 
Figure 1: The eﬀect of intrinsic motivation on the direct utility of eﬀort
In this section, we assume that the ﬁrm observes the worker’s motivation
γ and has all the bargaining power. The ﬁrm sets wage cost as low as
possible, but the wage must meet the worker’s participation constraint:
U[w(e),e,γie] ≥ Uout ≡ U(b,0,0) (3)
where Uout is the outside option of the worker. We assume that the worker’s
alternative to employment at this ﬁrm is living on an unemployment beneﬁt
b. More generally, the outside option of the worker would take into account
expected job opportunities at other ﬁrms. This could imply that the outside
option of a worker is dependent on a worker’s motivation γi in as far as
other ﬁrms may oﬀer jobs with the same kinds of intrinsic qualities. This
would weaken our argument that motivated workers are willing to work for
a lower wage. In a related paper, we analyse the eﬀects of competition in
the labour market for intrinsically motivated workers (Delfgaauw and Dur,
2002). There, we show that competition leads to higher wages, stronger
incentives, and higher productivity. In this paper, we abstract from outside
job opportunities. We thus focus on situations where the ﬁrm has (suﬃcient)
monopsonistic power, as in Janssen (2002).
The worker’s optimal amount of eﬀort is found by maximising the utility
function (1) to e:
max U → w0(e)U1(·)+U2(·)+γiU3(·)=0 (4)
In the optimum, the worker’s (ﬁnancial and motivational) marginal beneﬁts
of eﬀort equal the marginal cost of eﬀort.
The ﬁrm maximises proﬁts. Since the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power,
it sets the worker’s total compensation such that it leaves no rents to the
8worker. Though the ﬁrm does not directly control the worker’s eﬀort e,i t
can design a monetary incentive scheme that induces the worker to exert
the optimal level of eﬀort:7
max πs . t . U (·) ≥ Uout → q0(e) − w0(e)=0 (5)
In the optimum, the marginal product equals marginal wage cost.
First-order conditions (4) and (5) imply that if the ﬁrm sets the wage
scheme optimally, the worker’s marginal utility of eﬀort, apart from the eﬀect
of extra eﬀort on his income, is negative. Hence, people stating that they
enjoy every aspect of their work (”my work is my hobby”) are simply exerting
too little eﬀort (or, in other words, their wage scheme is suboptimal). Note
also that (4) and (5) imply that monetary incentives are stronger, the less
motivated is the worker (i.e., w0(e) is larger, the lower γi). Important for
this result is our assumption that q00(e) < 0. With constant returns to eﬀort
[q00(e)=0 ], the optimal reward per unit of eﬀort w0(e) equals the marginal
product of eﬀort q0(e), which is constant when q00(e)=0 .
The ﬁrm sets total compensation to the worker such that it leaves no
rents to the worker. In the optimum, the ﬁrm creates a compensation scheme
which induces the worker to choose the level of eﬀort deﬁned by (4) and (5)
at the lowest cost to the ﬁrm, implying that the worker ends up with a total
utility of U = Uout,d e ﬁned by (3).
Intrinsic motivation has two important eﬀects. First, the higher γ,t h e
higher the maximum wage the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer. Stated diﬀerently,
given the level of the wage, it is more proﬁtable to the ﬁrm to hire a worker
who is better motivated. The maximum wage the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer is
the wage which would leave the ﬁrm with zero proﬁt:
w(e)=q(e) (6)
Since marginal productivity q0(e) i sp o s i t i v e ,w eh a v et os h o wt h a te increases






where ∂2U(·)/∂e2 < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker’s optimi-
sation problem (4). Eﬀort increases in a worker’s motivation if U3 > −eγU33.
We assume that this condition holds: it is unlikely that a better motivated
worker works less hard because he enjoys working already so much. More
eﬀort implies more output. Hence, the maximum wage the ﬁrm is willing to
oﬀer increases in the worker’s motivation.
7When neither eﬀort nor production is veriﬁable, the ﬁrm cannot induce workers to
provide optimal eﬀort. We deal with this case at the end of this section.
9Second, given the level of eﬀort, intrinsic motivation aﬀects the wage the
ﬁrm needs to oﬀer to meet the worker’s participation constraint. We show
that for constant e =ˆ e, the minimum wage for which the worker is willing to








The expression in (8) is always negative: Given the level of eﬀort, a worker
who is better motivated for the job needs to be compensated less.
In general, the eﬀect of motivation on total wage compensation is am-
biguous. A higher motivated worker needs to be compensated less for each
unit of eﬀort. However, he exerts more eﬀort than lower motivated workers,
implying that the total wage may be increasing in motivation. In appendix
1w ep r o v et h a t
dw(e)





The right-hand side of this inequality denotes the net increase in disutility
due to the higher level of eﬀort. The left-hand side is the increase in mo-
tivational utility derived from all eﬀort the worker exerts, because of the
higher motivation. If, in the new optimum, the increased pleasure of work-
ing is higher than the burden of the additional eﬀort, workers with high
motivation need less ﬁnancial compensation than lower motivated workers.
Higher motivation thus has two eﬀects: the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer a
higher wage, while, given the level of eﬀort, the worker is willing to accept
a lower wage. Motivation therefore increases the joint surplus of the worker
and the ﬁrm. When the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power, it can extract
all rents from the motivation of the worker by adjusting the compensation
scheme. Furthermore, if condition (9) is satisﬁed, higher motivated workers
will be oﬀered lower wages, even though they are more productive.8 This
may give workers an incentive to conceal their motivation in job interviews.
Section 4 addresses this problem.
Both eﬀects of intrinsic motivation are also present in the case of a ﬁxed
wage. When the ﬁrm is unable or unwilling to use incentive wages,9 the
optimal level of eﬀort of the worker is given by (4) with w0(e) equal to zero.
8Allowing for a more equal distribution of bargaining power between the ﬁrm and the
workers need not aﬀect this result. As long as the ﬁrm has suﬃcient bargaining power,
the wage of the worker decreases in motivation, provided that condition (9) holds. See
Appendix 2.
9One reason why ﬁrms may refrain from providing monetary incentives to motivated
workers is high monitoring cost, see Weiss (1990, pp. 73-76). In case of multiple tasks,
monetary incentives may crowd out facets of tasks which are hard to observe by facets
of tasks which are more easily observed (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). Alternatively,
monetary incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, see the references in footnote 3.
10The eﬀect of intrinsic motivation on eﬀort is still given by (7). Eﬀort and
thus output increase in the worker’s motivation. This is also clear from
Figure 1: a worker’s optimal eﬀort with a ﬁx e dw a g ei sg i v e nb yt h et o po f
the curve, which moves to the right, the higher is γ. Hence, the maximum
ﬁxed wage the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer increases in the worker’s motivation.
Moreover, the minimum ﬁxed wage a worker is willing to accept decreases






In case of a ﬁxed wage, w0(e)=0 , condition (10) always holds. Therefore,
the higher motivation, the higher the direct utility from eﬀort, and the lower
the wage needs to be in order to meet the participation constraint of the
worker.
4 Attracting and Selecting Motivated Workers
This section examines how a ﬁrm can attract and select highly motivated
workers to ﬁll a vacancy. We consider three cases: One where the ﬁrm can
observe the motivation of the applicants, one where it can not, and one
where workers decide whether or not to signal their motivation. To focus
on the distributional conﬂict between the ﬁrm and the worker, we abstract
from monetary incentives and assume that the ﬁrm oﬀers a base salary only.
Allowing for monetary incentives does not aﬀect the results qualitatively,
which we show in Section 5, but it distracts attention from our main results.
4.1 Setup of the Model
A ﬁrm has one vacancy, and posts a ‘help-wanted’ ad. As in the previous
section, the ﬁrm has all the bargaining power. However, we assume that the
ﬁrm can credibly commit to pay at least a certain wage by posting a base
salary wmin in the ad. Workers diﬀer in their intrinsic motivation γ ∈ [0,¯ γ]
to work at this ﬁrm, while their outside options are identical, Uout.T h e r ei s
a discrete number of worker types in the economy, with nγi workers of type






Each worker has probability µ to observe the ad, 0 <µ<1.O n e r e a s o n
for µ<1 could be that not all workers read the newspaper every day. As a
result, the ﬁrm is uncertain about the composition of the group of potential
11applicants. If a worker decides to apply, she incurs application cost C.10
Following the results from the previous section, worker i’s indirect utility
function can be written as U(γi,w), with properties Uγ(·) > 0 and Uw(·) > 0,
and proﬁts of the ﬁrm as π(γi,w), with properties πγ(·) > 0 and πw(·) < 0.
Since condition (9) is always satisﬁed in case of a ﬁxed wage, the minimum
wage oﬀer a worker is willing to accept decreases in motivation. That is, if
γ>γ 0,t h e nU(γ,w)=U(γ0,w0) implies that w<w 0.
4.2 Observable Motivation
Suppose the ﬁrm can observe the level of intrinsic motivation of each appli-
cant. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The ﬁrm posts a ‘help-wanted’ ad, in which it can credibly commit to
a minimum wage.
2 .T h ew o r k e r sw h oo b s e r v et h ea dd e c i d ew h e t h e ro rn o tt oa p p l y .I fa
worker applies, she incurs cost C.
3. The ﬁrm observes the types of all applicants, selects one applicant,
and makes her a wage oﬀer w.
4. The applicant accepts or rejects. Rejection results in zero proﬁts.
We ﬁrst consider the case where the ﬁrm has not committed to a min-
imum wage at stage 1. We solve the model by backward induction. The
optimal strategy of each worker at stage 4 is simple: Accept if and only
if U(γi,w) ≥ Uout. Application costs are sunk at this stage. As proﬁts
increase in the worker’s motivation, the ﬁrm optimally selects the highest
motivated worker among the applicants. The optimal wage oﬀer is such that
U(γ,w)=Uout. This strategy of the ﬁrm at stage 3 makes that no worker
applies at stage 2. Each worker anticipates that the ﬁrm extracts all rents of
her motivation, leaving the worker with the sunk application cost. This re-
sult is known as the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971; see also Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999).11
To give workers an incentive to apply, the ﬁrm must make a credible
commitment not to extract all rents from their motivation. It can do so by
putting a minimum wage wmin in the ad at stage 1. If the minimum wage
is suﬃciently high, some worker types have positive expected beneﬁts from
applying. Since πγ(·) > 0,t h eﬁrm still selects the highest motivated worker
10Instead of µ<1, we could also assume that C is a random variable which diﬀers
among workers. Important for the results is that the ﬁrm faces some uncertainty about
the composition of the group of applicants.
11Note that if C =0 , all workers who observe the ad apply. The ﬁrm selects the highest
motivated worker and oﬀers her the wage that exactly meets her participation constraint,
as described in Section 3.
12from the pool of applicants at stage 3. If the lowest wage that this worker
would accept is below the minimum wage, the minimum wage is binding.
Otherwise, the ﬁrm oﬀers the wage that makes the worker indiﬀerent be-
tween accepting and rejecting. However, as above, these workers optimally
do not apply. Hence, the ﬁrm always oﬀers wmin.
At stage 2, worker i applies if the expected beneﬁts from applying are
positive. Obviously, if a certain worker type has positive expected beneﬁts
from applying, all workers with higher motivation also have positive expected
beneﬁts from applying. A worker of type γi applies if and only if:
f(γi)[U(γi,w min) − Uout] − C ≥ 0 (12)
where f(γi) is the expected probability for a worker of type γi to be selected
by the ﬁrm and U(γi,w min) is the utility that the worker obtains if she














where Nγi is given by (11). The ﬁrst term is the probability that all workers
with γ>γ i do not observe the ad. If any of these workers applies, then
worker i will not be selected by the ﬁrm. The second term gives the prob-
ability that worker i is selected from all applicants of the same type. This
probability is the function
1
1+x
,where x is the number of applicants with
motivation γi besides worker i, which follows a binomial distribution.
The ﬁrm sets the minimum wage such that expression (12) holds with
equality for the least motivated worker type that it wants to apply. Denote
this worker type by γmin.A s a r g u e d a b o v e , i f wmin <w 0
min,t h e nγmin >
γ0






F(γ)=( 1− µ)Nγ−nγ[1 − (1 − µ)nγ] (15)
is the probability that γ is the highest level of motivation among the appli-
cants, and π(γ,wmin) is the accompanying level of proﬁt. Suppose the ﬁrm
increases the minimum wage from wmin to w0
min such that γmin decreases
by one worker type to γ0






















Increasing the minimum wage leads to a higher probability of ﬁlling the
vacancy, as an additional worker type, γ0
min, has an incentive to apply after
observing the ad. This is reﬂected by the ﬁrst term. However, if some
worker with motivation higher than γ0
min observes the vacancy, the increase
in the minimum wage only leads to additional cost, as this worker would
have applied at the lower minimum wage as well. This is described by the
second term.
The ﬁrm sets the minimum wage such that 0 ≤ γmin ≤ ¯ γ. Starting from
the minimum wage at which only workers of type ¯ γ apply, a local optimal
minimum wage can be found by increasing the minimum wage until the
sign of ∆E[π] turns negative. In general, this local optimum need not be a
global optimum, as a very large nγ or very small [π(γ,w0
min)−π(γ,wmin)] can
change the sign of ∆E[π] from negative into positive. However, if nγ = n for
all γ and [π(γ,w0
min) − π(γ,wmin)] is constant in wmin, both the (positive)
ﬁrst term and the (negative) second term of (16) decrease in wmin,i m p l y i n g
that E[π(γ,wmin)] is concave in wmin. Then, there exists only one local and
global optimum. Corner solutions cannot be excluded. It is possible that
the optimal γmin is either 0 or ¯ γ.
4.3 Unobservable Motivation
When the ﬁrm can not observe the types of the applicants, it randomly
selects one applicant and makes her a wage oﬀer. As in the previous subsec-
tion, we assume that when the wage oﬀer is rejected, the ﬁrm ends up with
zero proﬁts.12
Consider ﬁrst the case where the ﬁrm has not committed to a minimum
wage. The beliefs of the ﬁrm about the distribution of applicants’ types
are crucial in determining the optimal wage oﬀer. Suppose that the ﬁrm
believes that there exists some γl such that only workers with γi ≥ γl apply
after observing the vacancy. Let wl b et h ew a g es u c ht h a tU(γl,w l)=Uout.
Given the ﬁrm’s beliefs, its optimal wage oﬀer w is such that w¯ γ ≤ w ≤ wl.
Hence, workers of type γl optimally decide not to apply as the wage oﬀer does
not compensate them for the application cost. This, in turn, reduces the
ﬁrm’s optimal wage, which removes the incentives of workers with slightly
12A more general set-up of the game would allow the ﬁrm to make a wage oﬀer to
another applicant (or a better wage oﬀer to the same worker) after a rejection. While
t h i sw o u l dr e d u c et h ep r o b a b i l i t yt oe n du pw i t ha nu n ﬁlled vacancy, it may increase the
rents that have to be left to the hired worker. Workers may wait for a next (higher) wage
oﬀer at the risk that an other applicant accepts one of the ﬁrm’s next oﬀers. Allowing for
multiple wage oﬀers will also aﬀect the decision to apply. We leave this for future research.
14higher motivation to apply. As this holds for any γl (including ¯ γ), the
market collapses, as in Akerlof’s lemon market. In Akerlof’s model, the
existence of bad types drives the good types out of the market (Akerlof,
1970). Interestingly, in our model, it is the withdrawal of the bad types
f r o mt h em a r k e tt h a td r i v e so u tt h eg o o dt y p e s .
Again, the ﬁrm needs to commit to a minimum wage in order to attract
applicants. Suppose the ﬁrm puts minimum wage wmin in its ad. Clearly,
this will also be the ﬁrm’s actual oﬀer.13 It follows that a worker of type γi
applies if and only if:
g(γi)[U(γi,w min) − Uout] − C ≥ 0 (17)
where g(γi) is the expected probability for a worker with motivation γi to




where v is the number of applicants besides worker i. v is a random variable














The ﬁrm sets the minimum wage such that expression (17) holds with
equality for the least motivated worker type, γmin, that it wants to apply.





where G(γ) is the probability that the ﬁrm selects an applicant with moti-
vation γ. This probability is
S
S + Z
,w h e r eS is the number of applicants of
type γ and Z the number of applicants with a diﬀerent type of motivation.
Both S and Z follow a binomial distribution, and their joint distribution is
given by:












where the ﬁrst equality follows from the observation that the two random
variables S and Z are independently distributed. Hence, G(γ) is described
13Oﬀering a higher wage could only be optimal if the ﬁrm believed that the least moti-
vated applicants would reject oﬀer wmin. However, these workers anticipate that they will
not be compensated for the application cost and, hence, optimally decide not to apply.




















The summation over s starts at s =1 , because G(γ)=0if none of the
workers with motivation γ observes the ad. Note that
P
γ≥γmin G(γ) <
1, as there may be no applicant at all, which happens with probability
(1 − µ)Nγmin.
Suppose the ﬁrm increases the minimum wage from wmin to w0
min,s u c h
that γmin decreases by one worker type to γ0
min. This reduces the probability



























min >N γmin by deﬁnition, G0(γ) <G (γ) for all γ ∈ [γmin, ¯ γ].I n t u -
itively, the probability that a worker of a certain type is selected decreases
if the number of worker types that apply increases. As the increase of
the minimum wage gives relatively low motivated workers an incentive to
apply, the expected quality of the selected applicant decreases. This se-
lection eﬀect imposes an additional cost of increasing the minimum wage
compared to the case where motivation is observable.14 As before, the in-







The increase in the minimum wage from wmin to w0
min leads to the fol-
























The ﬁrst term gives the probability of selecting a worker with motivation
γ0
min and the accompanying proﬁts. The second term indicates that by
14If C =0 ,t h eﬁrm need not to commit to a minimum wage to attract applicants.
However, the selection eﬀect makes that the ﬁrm might want to commit to a maximum
wage, in order to reduce the number of relatively low motivated workers in the pool of
applicants, as in Handy and Katz (1998). Note also that a maximum wage is of no use
when C>0.
16increasing wmin to w0
min, each worker type γ ≥ γmin has a lower probability
to be selected, and, given a selected worker type, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is
lower as a result of the wage increase. This expression is negative, since
G0(γ) <G (γ) for all γ ∈ [γmin,¯ γ] and π(γ,w0
min) <π (γ,wmin).
The ﬁrm sets the minimum wage such that 0 ≤ γmin ≤ ¯ γ.Al o c a lm a x i -
mum of the expected proﬁt function can be found by increasing the minimum
wage until ∆E[π] turns negative. As in the previous subsection, this local
optimal minimum wage need not be a global optimum. However, if nγ = n
for all γ and [π(γ,w0
min) − π(γ,wmin)] is constant in wmin,b o t ht h eﬁrst
and the second term of (22) decrease in wmin,i m p l y i n gt h a tE[π(γ,wmin)]
is concave in wmin. Then, there exists only one local and global maximum.
Corner solutions are possible, it might happen that the optimal γmin is either
0 or ¯ γ.
4.4 Motivation Can Be Signaled
Suppose that the ﬁrm can not observe the motivation of the applicants, but
applicants can credibly signal their type to the ﬁrm.15 Obviously, when
the ﬁrm does not commit to a minimum wage, none of the workers apply,
as in the previous subsections. Each applicant anticipates that when she
signals her type, the ﬁrm fully extracts all the rents of motivation, leaving
the applicant with the sunk application cost. Because no applicant reveals
her type to the ﬁrm, motivation remains unobservable. As we have seen in
the previous subsection, this results in a complete breakdown of the market.
When the ﬁrm posts a minimum wage wmin, each applicant signals her
motivation to the ﬁrm. The intuition is that signaling increases a worker’s
probability to get the job. Consider an applicant with motivation ¯ γ and
suppose that all other applicants do not signal their motivation. If she
signals, she is certain to get the job. If she does not signal, she only gets
the job if she is randomly selected. Hence, she signals her type as signaling
increases her probability to be selected by the ﬁrm. This also holds when
other workers signal. Next, consider workers of the highest but one type of
motivation, γh. Signaling is of no avail when a worker of type ¯ γ is in the
pool of applicants. However, if none of the workers of type ¯ γ apply, signaling
is beneﬁcial, as the ﬁrm prefers to select a worker of type γh if there are
no workers of type ¯ γ available. Since workers have no information about
the other applicants and signaling is costless, it is always in the interest of
workers of type γh to signal their type. Analogously, all applicants have an
incentive to signal their type so as to increase the probability to get the job.
It follows that a worker only gets the job if she is the highest motivated
applicant, as in Subsection 4.1 where the ﬁrm could observe the motivation
of the applicants. Hence, workers have the same incentives to apply as in
15If signals are not credible, motivation remains unobservable, as all applicants would
signal that they have motivation ¯ γ.
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Figure 2: Intrinsic motivation and the optimal monetary incentive scheme
Subsection 4.1, and the ﬁrm optimally sets the minimum wage at the same
level.
5 Signaling and Screening with Optimal Monetary
Incentive Schemes
This section shows that the results derived in Section 4 under the assumption
of a ﬁxed wage generalise to the case where the ﬁrm provides monetary
incentives to the worker, as in Section 3.
Suppose the ﬁrm wants that only workers with motivation ¯ γ apply. Anal-
ogous to the previous section, the ﬁrm needs to commit to a minimum wage
scheme in order to attract applicants, regardless of whether or not the ﬁrm
can observe the motivation of the applicants. The ﬁr mh a st oc o m m i tt oa
minimum wage scheme that satisﬁes the following constraint:
p(¯ γ)
©
U [w(e),e,¯ γe] − Uoutª
− C ≥ 0
where p(¯ γ) is the probability of a worker of type ¯ γ to get the job, given by
(13) in case of observable motivation and by (18) in case of unobservable
motivation, respectively. Optimal eﬀort is again described by ﬁrst-order
conditions (4) and (5), with γi =¯ γ. Clearly, there exists many wage schemes
that satisfy these conditions. One of these is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 depicts the marginal product of eﬀort [q0(e)] and the marginal
disutility from eﬀo r tf o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent types of workers. The latter curves







where i ∈ {m,h, ¯ γ}, γm <γ h < ¯ γ. Equation (23) describes for each level
of eﬀort the minimum reward the ﬁrm must provide to induce a worker of
type γi to provide an additional unit of eﬀort. Notice that when the ﬁrm
creates an incentive scheme which follows (23) exactly, the worker is just
compensated for his (net) disutility from eﬀort. In order to give workers an
incentive to apply, the ﬁrm has to make sure that a worker with motivation
γmin =¯ γ ends up (in expected terms) with utility Uout. Hence, the ﬁrm
must oﬀer a base salary Bγmin such that:




An optimal minimum wage scheme which induces only workers with
motivation ¯ γ to apply thus consists of a base salary Bγmin, given by (24)
with γmin =¯ γ, and a monetary incentive scheme which follows (23) up to
the point where w0
¯ γ(e)=q0(e). Denote the accompanying level of eﬀort by






This minimum wage oﬀer is just suﬃcient to induce workers with motivation
¯ γ to apply. All other worker types have negative expected beneﬁts from
applying, and, hence, decide not to apply.
Now suppose the ﬁrm prefers to give the highest two types an incentive
to apply, types ¯ γ and γh. As in the previous section, this implies that the
ﬁr mh a st ol e a v ear e n tt ow o r k e r so ft y p e¯ γ.T h e ﬁrm optimally trades
oﬀ the rents it has to leave in case the selected applicant appears to be a
worker of type ¯ γ and the eﬀort exerted by a worker of type γh. The proﬁt


















where eh is the level of eﬀort a worker of type γh is induced to exert by
this proﬁt maximising scheme, and P(γh) and P(¯ γ) are the probabilities
that a worker of type γh and a worker of type ¯ γ are hired, given by (15)
when motivation is observable and by (20) when motivation is unobservable,
respectively. Base salary Bγh is implicitly given by (24) with γmin = γh,a n d
wh(·) and w0
¯ γ(·) are described by (23) with γi = γh,¯ γ, respectively. The ﬁrst
19term in brackets is the ﬁrm’s proﬁti nc a s eaw o r k e ro ft y p eγh is hired, which
happens with probability P(γh). In expected terms, the ﬁrm does not leave
ar e n tt ot h e s ew o r k e r s . T h eﬁrst derivative to eh of this term is equal to
zero when eh equals the optimal eﬀort level of workers of type γh under full
information, described in Section 3. The second term in brackets is the ﬁrm’s
proﬁti nc a s eaw o r k e ro ft y p e¯ γ is hired, which happens with probability
P(¯ γ). To meet this worker’s individual rationality constraint, the ﬁrm must
provide monetary incentives as if the worker is of type γh up to eﬀort level
eh. Hence, the ﬁrm leaves a rent to workers of type ¯ γ. Starting from eﬀort
level eh,t h eﬁrm just compensates workers of type ¯ γ for each additional unit
of eﬀort. The ﬁrst derivative to eh of the second term is always negative
since w0
h(e) >w 0
¯ γ(e) for any e. Clearly, it is in the ﬁrm’s interest to set eh
lower than the optimal eﬀort level under full information, which we derived
in Section 3. The proﬁt maximising wage scheme induces a worker of type
γh to exert suboptimally low eﬀort so as to reduce the rents which the ﬁrm
has to leave in case the oﬀer is made to a worker of type ¯ γ.16 Workers of
type ¯ γ are induced to exert an eﬃcient level of eﬀort, as in Section 3. The
ﬁrm must, however, leave a rent to these workers. The optimal wage scheme










Along the same lines, we can derive the optimal wage scheme when the
ﬁrm wants to induce more worker types to apply. The lower γmin,t h e
higher the base salary and the higher the incentive wage up to eγmin must
be in order to give workers with motivation γ ≥ γmin an incentive to apply.
The wage scheme is such that each worker type – except ¯ γ –e x e r t sa
suboptimal level of eﬀort, so as to decrease the rents the ﬁrm has to leave to
higher types. As in Section 4, the optimal wage scheme entails a trade-oﬀ
between the probability to ﬁll the vacancy, the rents left to workers, and, if
motivation is unobservable, the expected quality of the selected worker. It
is straightforward to show that the ﬁrm needs to commit to a suﬃciently
high base salary so as to attract applicants and to give them an incentive to
signal their motivation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have studied a model in which workers diﬀer in their intrin-
sic motivation to exert eﬀort at the workplace. We have shown that higher
motivated workers are more valuable to the ﬁr m ,b o t hi nt h ep r e s e n c ea n di n
16For a similar result in a more general context see chapter 7 in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1992).
20the absence of monetary incentives. In addition, higher motivated workers
might be willing to work for a lower wage. When the ﬁrm has suﬃcient
bargaining power, workers have no incentive to apply for a job at the ﬁrm.
We have shown that a credible commitment to a minimum wage may solve
this problem. Furthermore, if workers can choose between concealing and
signaling their motivation, commitment to a minimum wage induces work-
ers to signal. This leads to an optimal selection of workers. The optimal
level of the minimum wage depends on the ﬁrm’s capability to observe the
motivation of the applicants. When the ﬁrm observe motivation, the opti-
mal minimum wage is determined by the trade-oﬀ between wage cost and
the probability of ﬁlling the vacancy. If motivation is unobservable to the
ﬁrm, a selection eﬀect is added, as the presence of low motivated applicants
decreases the probability that a higher motivated applicant is selected.
There are several ways in which the analysis could be extended. An
interesting extension is to allow for two-sided uncertainty. Benabou and
Tirole (2003) have recently studied optimal incentive schemes when the ﬁrm
is better informed about the attractiveness of the job than the worker. While
this is an appropriate assumption in a number of cases, we think there
are many other cases in which the ﬁrm is much more uncertain about the
motivation of an applicant than the applicant is about the intrinsic qualities
of the job. Jobs are usually clearly deﬁned, which gives an applicant the
possibility to ﬁlter out a vacancy that ﬁts her interest. For the employer,
the applicant is usually a complete stranger.
Throughout we have assumed that the applicants’ outside opportunities
are independent of the intrinsic motivation for the job. More generally, the
outside option of the worker would take into account expected job opportu-
nities, and their intrinsic qualities, at other ﬁrms. This could imply that the
outside option of a worker is dependent on a worker’s motivation in as far as
other ﬁrms may oﬀer jobs with the same types of intrinsic qualities, which
would weaken our argument that motivated workers are willing to work for a
lower wage, see Delfgaauw and Dur (2002). However, when workers are suf-
ﬁciently uncertain about future job opportunities at other ﬁrms, they may
be reluctant to reject a wage oﬀer which partially extracts their motivational
rents.
Relatedly, some people may be more motivated than others, independent
of the type of job. But referring to the example of the veterinary surgeon
who will probably not be very motivated to work as a butcher, it is unlikely
that people always have the same level of motivation, regardless of the job
they have. And as long as not all people have the same relative diﬀerences
in motivation between diﬀerent jobs, there exists an eﬃcient allocation of
workers over jobs, along the same lines as the comparative advantage prin-
ciple of Ricardo.
21AA p p e n d i x 1
In this appendix we derive the condition under which the total wage com-
pensation decreases in motivation. For this purpose, it is convenient to write
the wage scheme as:
w(e)=q(e)+B (A1)
Hence, in line with ﬁrst-order condition (5), workers get their full marginal
product, while the base salary B is such that the participation constraint of
the worker is just satisﬁed:
U(w(e),e,γe)=U(q(e)+B,e,γe)=Uout (A2)
By combining the optimal wage scheme (A1) and the ﬁrst-order conditions
for eﬀort (4) and proﬁt (5), it follows that the optimal level of eﬀort is
implicitly given by:
q0(e)U1(·)+U2(·)+γU3(·)=0 (A3)
In Section 3, we derived the eﬀect of a marginal change in γ on the optimal







where ∂F/∂e < 0 is the second-order condition to the worker’s optimisation
problem (A3). We are interested in the sign of
dw(e)


















dγ is given by (A4). The second term on the right-hand side of (A5)















where the term in square brackets is zero by ﬁrst-order condition (A3) (the













22where the second equality follows from (A3). Total wage compensation thus





which is identical to condition (9) in the main text.
BA p p e n d i x 2
Suppose the wage results from a bargain between the ﬁrm and the worker, of
which the outcome is described by the generalised Nash bargaining function.
The worker’s bargaining power is denoted by χ,t h eﬁrm has bargaining
power 1 − χ (0 ≤ χ ≤ 1). Note that apart from the total compensation to
the worker, the incentive scheme derived in Section 3 is optimal for both
the ﬁrm and the worker. Denote the minimum wage for which the worker is
willing to work by wmin(γ). The maximum wage the ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer
is denoted by wmax(γ). The wage that results from the bargaining is the
minimum wage plus a proportion χ of the total rents (the diﬀerence between
the maximum and the minimum wage):
w = wmin(γ)+χ[wmax(γ) − wmin(γ)]







In Section 3 we have shown that w0
max(γ) > 0 and w0
min(γ) < 0,p r o v i d e d








Hence, as long as χ is suﬃciently low, the wage decreases in the motivation
of the worker.
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